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Abstract
Testing of cryptographic chips or components has one
extra dimension: physical security. The chip designers
should improve the design if it leaks too much information
through side-channels, such as timing, power consumption,
electric-magnetic radiation, and so on. This requires an
evaluation of the security level of the chip under different
side-channel attacks before it is manufactured. This paper
presents an FPGA-based testing strategy for cryptographic
chips. Using a block-based architecture, a testing bus and a
shadow FPGA, we are able to check information leakage of
each block. We describe this strategy with an Elliptic Curve
Cryptosystem (ECC) for RFID tags.
1 Introduction
Public Key Cryptosystems (PKC) such as Elliptic Curve
Cryptosystem (ECC) are used in RFID tags [7] to pro-
vide chip authentication to the reader. Implementing ECC
on such a small device with limited power budgets is a
challenge. Side-channels attacks, such as Timing Analy-
sis (TA) [5], Power Analysis (PA) [6] and Fault Analysis
(FA) [2], have been studied extensively in recent years. As
a result, the designers of cryptographic chips/components
need to evaluate how much information is leaked though
the side-channels, and improve the design if necessary. In
this paper, we propose a strategy of testing cryptographic
chips/components using FPGAs. Though the term ”testing”
normally means on-line testing of the manufactured chip,
here we also use it to denote estimation of physical secu-
rity in the design phase. It is also because that the proposed
strategy enable a FPGA-based environment for on-line test-
ing of the manufactured chip. The strategy mainly consists
of (1) block-based design for testing, (2) shadow implemen-
tation and (3) attack-based security check. We will present
the details with a case study on an ECC implementation for
RFID tags.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the general strategy for testing of cryptographic
chips. In Section 3 we present a case study on testing ECC
implementations. We conclude the paper in Section 4.
2 A general testing strategy for crypto-
graphic chips
For cryptographic hardware, there are mainly two types
of testing: functionality and security. While functionality
can be tested with traditional methods, such as a scan-chain,
the security testing requires specific knowledge about the
cryptosystem and related attacks. Figure 1 shows the front-
end design flow of cryptographic hardware. Here function-
ality verification is to check the output of circuit with the
reference model, while the security estimation is to check
how much information is leaked through side-channels and
how likely it will be broken by known attacks. If the test
results indicate vulnerabilities, the design must be modified
to eliminate it.
With the proposed method, all the blocks are connected
to a testing bus, which can make the ports of each block ex-
ternal. The testing bus consists of only combinational logic
and should not increase the critical path delay. A shadow
of a block, say block X, is the complete implementation ex-
cept block X. Using two FPGA boards, we could do fast
testing on any block. For instance, in order to test block
X, the design is configured so that looking from outside the
whole design is just block X. X’s shadow is implemented on
FPGA2. These two FPGAs are connected with testing bus,
making a complete implementation. With this method, we
avoid generating waveform for testing circuitry and com-
paring the output with reference data. When the chip is
Figure 1. Cryptographic hardware design flow
taped out, we can simply replace FPGA1 with the chip, and
start testing each block immediately.
3 A case study on ECC implementation
We present the test strategy in detail with a case study.
An ECC processor is designed for RFID tags. We will test
the functionality and security of the ECC implementation
with the method described above.
3.1 ECC processor
In ECC based cryptographic protocols, the curve E is de-
fined over a finite field K. A nice mathematical background
of ECC can be found in [3]. Given a point P on E and an in-
teger k, the ECC engine calculates Q=kP. It is believed that
finding out k from P and Q is a hard problem in mathemat-
ics. Using this feature, ECC supports data encryption/de-
cryption, key agreement and identity authentication. Alg. 1
describes a method to compute kP.
Figure 2 shows block diagram of the ECC implementa-
tion with a shadow. It consists of a microprocessor, Elliptic
Curve Processor (ECP) which contains a Modular Arith-
metic Logic Unit (MALU) and a register file, a True Ran-
dom Number Generator (TRNG) and a ROM to store the
curve parameters. All the blocks are connected to a BUS. A
testing bus is inserted in the ECC processor such that each
block is accessible from outside. Here the module under
Algorithm 1 Compute kP Using Montgomery Ladder [4].
Input: P = (xp, yp), k = (kl−1kl−2 · · · k0)2
Output: Q = (xq, yq) = kP
1: P1 ← P , P0 ← 2P
2: for i from l − 2 downto 0 do
3: P[ki] ← P1 + P0, P[1−ki] ← 2P[1−ki]
4: end for
5: Return P1
test is ECP, which is the main source of area and power con-
sumption. On FPGA1, the ECP is selected, and all the rest
is shut down. On FPGA2, ECP’s shadow implementation
is downloaded. The components implemented on FPGA2
(shadow) are carefully verified and now serve as a testing
environment after the chip is manufactured.
3.2 Security test
Security test is driven by attack models. Successful at-
tacks on ECC with different methods, i.e. TA,PA and FA
have been reported. In this paper we present the prelimi-
nary results of TA/SPA on this ECC implementation.
Timing Analysis (TA)
TA on ECC scalar multiplication is usually based on the
fact that the delay of operations when key bit is 1 might
be different from that of key bit 0. The algorithm used in
this chip, the Montgomery Ladder, is supposed to be secure
against TA. However, in practice it can still be vulnerable if
Figure 2. Testing methods for ECC processor
it is not carefully implemented.
Simple Power Analysis (SPA)
Simple Power Analysis on ECC scalar multiplication is
based on the fact that power consumption may differ when
key bit is 1 or 0. Note that even if the same number of clock
cycles are used for each key bit, different patterns in the
power trace can reveal key bit.
3.2.1 On board test
The design shown in Figure 4 is implemented and tested.
We choose the SASEBO board [1] as the platform. The
SASEBO board is designed for the purpose of side-channel
attack evaluation. It has two FPGAs, a control FPGA and
a target FPGA. We put the ECC processor on the target
FPGA and the shadow on the control FPGA. The power
consumption of ECP during a scalar multiplication is mea-
sured. Both FPGAs work on a clock frequency of 1 MHz.
Figure 3 shows the power trace of the first 4000 clock cy-
cles. One can clearly see parameter loading in the beginning
and 10 iterations of Algorithm 1 afterwards.
Figure 3 shows that each iteration takes the same time.
This means that Algorithm 1 was carefully balanced for key
bit being 1 and 0, and attackers can hardly reveal the key
stream using Timing Analysis. A preliminary inspection on
the the power trace shows no obvious patterns repeating for
ki = 1 or k0 = 0, which means the implementation of ECC
is SPA resistant to a certain degree.
Since ASIC has different layout from FPGA implemen-
tations, the security estimation on FPGA can only serve as
an indication but not a guarantee. The security of a design
against side-channel attacks can only be evaluated after the
chip is produced. However, the approach described above
enables an early estimation of information leakage in the
Figure 3. Averaged power trace of the ECP
component during point multiplication
design phase. Besides, as shown in Fig 3, the block-based
testing allows a more precise measurement on the informa-
tion leakage.
4 Conclusions
We propose a strategy for testing cryptographic designs
with FPGA boards. Using block-based architecture and
shadow implementation, the functionality of each compo-
nent can be easily tested. Moreover, this strategy gives an
early estimation of physical security. Each component of
the chip can be tested alone, giving a more accurate esti-
mation of information leakage than measuring the whole
design.
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